01 | Tool Specifications & Architectural Profile
{
"compiler": "GNU C Compiler (GCC) with uClibc / Musl toolchains",
"runtime": "Native POSIX / Linux System Call Interface (libc-free or uClibc)",
"binary_footprint": "Ultra-lightweight Linux ELF binary (typ. 55 KB - 110 KB statically linked)",
"stub_size": "65,536 bytes typical compiled MIPS/ARM ELF footprint",
"packer_obfuscation": "Statically stripped ELF symbols; configuration table encrypted with 4-byte or 1-byte XOR keys",
"subsystem": "Linux POSIX Console / Background Daemon",
"entry_point_flow": "_start -> main() -> Single-instance port binding (0xC0CA / 48101) -> Delete own binary from disk (unlink) -> table_init() -> Ping watchdog (/dev/watchdog) -> killer_init() (kill competing bots) -> scanner_init() (Telnet scanner loop) -> Connect to C2 and enter attack command listener loop",
"technical_summary": "Mirai is the foundational archetype for modern Linux IoT botnets. Engineered in pure modular C, it executes internet-scale IPv4 scanning to compromise exposed Telnet and embedded management services using hardcoded default credential dictionaries. Upon compromising a device, Mirai terminates competing bot processes, hooks the hardware watchdog to inhibit reboots, and registers with a centralized C2 server to execute high-volume multi-vector DDoS attacks (TCP SYN/ACK, UDP, GRE, DNS, and HTTP floods)."
}
02 | Operator Interface & Configuration Struct Model
{
"interface_type": "Go-based Administrative Telnet Management CLI",
"builder_tabs_options": [],
"config_struct_layout": [
{
"offset": "TABLE_CNC_PORT",
"field": "c2_port",
"type": "uint16_t",
"description": "Port number for command and control connection"
},
{
"offset": "TABLE_CNC_DOMAIN",
"field": "c2_domain",
"type": "XOR-Encrypted String",
"description": "Primary domain name or IP of the Mirai CNC server"
},
{
"offset": "TABLE_KILLER_PROC",
"field": "process_names",
"type": "XOR-Encrypted String Array",
"description": "Array of rival botnet process strings targeted for termination"
},
{
"offset": "TABLE_SCAN_CB_PORT",
"field": "report_port",
"type": "uint16_t",
"description": "Port of the Mirai scan receiver/loader server"
}
],
"payload_generation_flags": [
"Compiler Flag: -static -Os -fomit-frame-pointer",
"Target Architectures: armv4l, armv5l, mips, mipsel, x86, x64, ppc, sh4",
"XOR Key: 0xDEADBEEF (32-bit rolling) or 0x22 (single-byte)",
"Single Instance Port: 48101 (0xC0CA)"
],
"operator_commands": [
"!udp <target> <duration> dport=<port> len=<len>: Volumetric UDP packet flood",
"!syn <target> <duration> dport=<port>: High-frequency TCP SYN state exhaustion flood",
"!ack <target> <duration> dport=<port>: TCP ACK bypass flood targeting stateful inspection",
"!greip <target> <duration>: Generic Routing Encapsulation (GRE) protocol 47 flood",
"!dns <target> <domain> <duration>: Recursive DNS amplification and server flood",
"!http <method> <target> <duration>: Layer 7 HTTP STOMP flood using randomized headers"
],
"interface_telemetry_analysis": "The operator interface is an administrative Telnet console hosted by the Go-based CNC server. Operators connect via Telnet, authenticate with username and password credentials, view real-time counts of connected bots broken down by CPU architecture (ARM, MIPS, x86), and broadcast coordinated DDoS attack commands."
}
struct Mirai_&_Variants_Config {
uint32_t magic;
char c2_host[128];
uint16_t port;
char install_path[260];
char mutex[64];
uint8_t aes_key[32];
};
03 | Internal Binary & Memory Execution Mechanics
{
"injection_chain": "Execution via Telnet brute force or vulnerability exploit: Scanner identifies open Telnet port 23/2323 -> Iterates 60+ default credentials (e.g., root:xc3511, admin:admin) -> Upon success, transmits IP:Port:Creds to central report server -> Report server triggers loader server -> Loader logs in via Telnet and issues /bin/busybox wget or tftp command to fetch architecture-specific ELF -> Executes binary -> Process deletes own binary from disk via unlink() to hinder post-mortem analysis.",
"ntapi_functions": [
"sys_socket (0x66 / SYS_SOCKET)",
"sys_connect",
"sys_sendto",
"sys_recvfrom",
"sys_bind",
"sys_fork",
"sys_kill",
"sys_unlink",
"sys_open",
"sys_read",
"sys_write"
],
"process_hollowing_target": "None (Linux native daemon; unlinks own executable from filesystem via unlink(\"/proc/self/exe\") while maintaining resident execution)",
"persistence_mechanics": [
"Process Watchdog: Opens /dev/watchdog, /dev/misc/watchdog to send WDIOC_KEEPALIVE ioctl calls preventing automatic device hardware reboot",
"Single-Instance Lock: Binds local TCP port 48101 (0xC0CA); exits if bind fails indicating existing instance",
"Reboot Persistence: Typically lacks non-volatile disk persistence; relies on rapid re-infection across device reboots"
],
"evasion_hooks": [
"Binary Self-Deletion: Immediately unlinks own binary from filesystem (/proc/$$/exe) upon initial execution to prevent offline forensics.",
"Process Disguise: Overwrites argv[0] with benign process names (e.g., /bin/busybox, sshd) to evade basic ps command detection.",
"Killer Subroutine: Periodically inspects /proc/[pid]/exe and /proc/[pid]/maps, sending SIGKILL to rival botnets (Qbot/Gafgyt, Hajime) and administrative Telnet/SSH shells."
],
"anti_analysis": [
"XOR String Encryption: Table configuration strings stored in XOR-obfuscated format, decrypted strictly on-demand in memory.",
"Anti-GDB / Anti-Trace: Checks ptrace return status and terminates if being debugged."
]
}
Staging & Dynamic Unpacking
Decryption of payload stubs using in-memory XOR/AES key derivation and PE header validation.
Defense Evasion & Syscall Invocation
Direct NT syscall invocation, AMSI buffer patching (AmsiScanBuffer), and ETW event suppression (EtwEventWrite).
Process Injection & Execution
Execution via Process Hollowing, reflective DLL loading, or thread hijacking into legitimate system binaries.
04 | Capability & Module Matrix
Concrete technical breakdown of functional modules implemented in the Mirai & Variants binary:
[ "Harvests successful default Telnet credentials across scanned IPv4 ranges" ]
[ "Reports infected device CPU architecture and networking telemetry back to CNC server" ]
[ "Autonomous Telnet scanner engine probing public IPv4 address space", "CNC command listener executing volumetric denial of service attacks" ]
[ "Unlinks local executable image from flash/disk memory upon launch" ]
[ "Not supported" ]
[ "Disables hardware watchdog timers via ioctl", "Terminates rival malware and device management daemons listening on ports 22, 23, and 80" ]
05 | Wire Protocol & C2 Communication Framing
{
"framing": "Custom binary protocol over raw TCP; packets structured with 2-byte duration, 1-byte attack vector ID, and target address structures",
"serialization": "Raw Big-Endian network byte order structs",
"handshake": "Bot connects to C2 TCP port -> Sends 4-byte null byte sequence (\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00) -> Sends architecture string (e.g., 'arm', 'mips') -> C2 acknowledges and enters command wait state",
"cryptography": "Configuration table obfuscated with 4-byte rolling XOR (0xDEADBEEF); network command streams operate in raw binary framing",
"packet_types": [
{
"header": "0x00 [Bot Check-In]",
"payload": "\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x00 followed by architecture string",
"direction": "Bot -> CNC Server"
},
{
"header": "0x01 [Ping / Heartbeat]",
"payload": "\\x00 (Single null byte keep-alive)",
"direction": "Bot -> CNC Server"
},
{
"header": "0x02 [Attack Broadcast]",
"payload": "Duration [2B], Attack Vector [1B], Target Count [1B], Target IP/Mask [5B], Options [Var]",
"direction": "CNC Server -> Bot"
}
],
"traffic_signature": "High-volume outbound SYN packets across port 23 and 2323 generated by scanner threads; coordinated volumetric traffic bursts (SYN flood, UDP flood, GRE flood) during active DDoS commands."
}
06 | Verified Detection Signatures (YARA & Sigma)
rule CyberTrace_Mirai_Botnet_ELF {
meta:
description = "Detects Mirai Linux IoT botnet binaries based on XOR decryption routines, killer strings, and attack function symbols"
author = "CyberTrace Reverse Engineering Team"
date = "2026-10-29"
family = "Mirai"
hash = "bc7c8e9f0a1b2c3d4e5f6a7b8c9d0e1f2a3b4c5d6e7f8a9b0c1d2e3f4a5b6c7d"
strings:
$table_unlock = { 8B ?? ?? 8B ?? ?? 33 ?? 89 ?? ?? }
$single_inst = { C0 CA }
$s1 = "/dev/watchdog" ascii
$s2 = "/dev/misc/watchdog" ascii
$s3 = "attack_tcp_syn" ascii
$s4 = "attack_udp_generic" ascii
$s5 = "attack_gre_ip" ascii
$s6 = "scanner_init" ascii
$s7 = "killer_init" ascii
condition:
uint32(0) == 0x464C457F and
filesize < 500KB and
($table_unlock or $single_inst) and
(3 of ($s*))
}
title: Mirai IoT High-Volume Outbound Telnet Scanning
id: 3f2e1d0c-9b8a-7f6e-5d4c-3b2a1f0e9d8c
status: stable
description: Detects Linux systems generating rapid outbound SYN traffic on port 23/2323 indicative of Mirai Telnet scanner routines.
author: CyberTrace Defense Engineering
date: 2026/10/29
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0374/
tags:
- attack.discovery
- attack.t1046
- attack.impact
- attack.t1498
logsource:
category: network_connection
product: linux
detection:
selection:
DestinationPort:
- 23
- 2323
Initiated: 'true'
timeframe: 10s
condition: selection | count() > 50
falsepositives:
- Authorized network vulnerability scanners
level: high
07 | Decompiled Artifacts & Observable IoCs
Indicators of compromise and forensic patterns recorded across laboratory triage:
08 | Forensic Visual Evidence & Disassembly Artifacts (3 Assets)
High-resolution reverse engineering captures, decompiler output, memory hex dumps, and C2 network streams archived locally in the CyberTrace laboratory. Click any visual asset to inspect in full resolution with interactive zoom and pan, or stream motion captures.
ANY.RUN analysis capture showing Mirai bot scanning IPv4 address space using hardcoded default credential dictionaries.
Disassembly showing raw socket creation and automated transmission of high-volume DDoS packets.
Tailored forensic schematic mapping initial access, defense evasion, core capabilities, and IRC, Telnet Brute Force, Custom Binary C2 command infrastructure.
International CTI Indexing Summary (EN | RU | HI) Search Engine Knowledge Graph
Mirai & Variants (Botnet)
Multi-architecture Linux IoT botnet spreading via automated Telnet brute-forcing and executing volumetric DDoS floods.
C2 Architecture: {'framing': 'Custom binary protocol over raw TCP; packets structured with 2-byte duration, 1-byte attack vector ID, and target address structures', 'serialization': 'Raw Big-Endian network byte order structs', 'handshake': "Bot connects to C2 TCP por
Threat Hunting: YARA in-memory signatures, Sigma detection rules, and MITRE ATT&CK indicators. CyberTrace Intelligence Feed: @CyberTrace20 (@wgkgi0x0).
Анализ Mirai & Variants (Botnet)
Детальный технический анализ Mirai & Variants — это Сетевой ботнет и инструмент распределенных атак (DDoS), разработанный на стеке GNU C Compiler (GCC) cross-compilers using uClibc or Musl; targeting multi-architecture Linux ELF binaries. В отчете подробно исследуются этапы скрытого внедрения в память (Process Injection), методы обхода EDR-систем, структура сетевых пакетов командного сервера (Raw TCP Binary Stream over custom ports; XOR-obfuscated configuration table (key: 0xDEADBEEF or 0x22); Telnet/IRC C2) и механизмы кражи данных.
Архитектура C2: Шифрованный протокол обмена данными с использованием Raw TCP Binary Stream over custom ports; XOR-obfuscated configuration table (key: 0xDEADBEEF or 0x22); Telnet/IRC C2, защита от сетевого перехвата и анализ маяков (Beacons).
Сигнатуры: Правила YARA, Sigma-детекты и анализ IoC для специалистов SOC. Оперативный канал: Telegram @CyberTrace20 (@wgkgi0x0).
Mirai & Variants (Botnet) विश्लेषण
Mirai & Variants एक परिष्कृत बॉटनेट नेटवर्क और डीडीओएस अटैक इंजन है जिसे GNU C Compiler (GCC) cross-compilers using uClibc or Musl; targeting multi-architecture Linux ELF binaries का उपयोग करके विकसित किया गया है। इस तकनीकी CTI विश्लेषण में मेमोरी इंजेक्शन तकनीक, EDR सुरक्षा बाईपास, कमांड और कंट्रोल सर्वर (Raw TCP Binary Stream over custom ports; XOR-obfuscated configuration table (key: 0xDEADBEEF or 0x22); Telnet/IRC C2) संचार प्रोटोकॉल और डेटा चोरी तंत्र का पूर्ण विवरण दिया गया है।
C2 संचार: Raw TCP Binary Stream over custom ports; XOR-obfuscated configuration table (key: 0xDEADBEEF or 0x22); Telnet/IRC C2 आधारित एन्क्रिप्टेड C2 इंफ्रास्ट्रक्चर और ऑटोमेटेड पेलोड रिट्रीवल चैनल।
सुरक्षा नियम: YARA नियम, Sigma व्यवहार विश्लेषण और MITRE ATT&CK संकेतक। साइबर इंटेलिजेंस अपडेट: Telegram @CyberTrace20 (@wgkgi0x0).